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REDISTRICTING LITIGATION IN THE NEXT
MILLENNIUM
Benjamin E. Griffith*
Redistricting, like reproduction, combines lofty goals, deep pas-
sions about identity and instincts for self-preservation, increas-
ing reliance on technology, and often a need to "pull [and]
haul" rather indelicately at the very end. And of course, it of-
ten involves somebody getting screwed.1
It is certain that the 2000 census will set the stage for an "ongoing pas-
sion play" of state and local government redistricting. Indeed, the pen-
dulum has swung. Those on the receiving end of a decade of Justice De-
partment-inspired racial gerrymandering argue that it swings more
equitably. Others argue that it swings too far to the right. They com-
plain that the Supreme Court's doctrinal shifts portend an era of uncer-
tainty, unpredictability and destabilization, and that partisan realign-
ment of the Southern States will translate into divided partisan control
and inevitable "apportionment deadlock,"4 requiring judicial rather than
legislative resolution. Optimists, on the other hand, say the pendulum is
approaching equilibrium only now.
Post-2000 retrogression analysis, moreover, will be a more complex
process than ever before. As the U.S. Supreme Court places more and
more distance between itself and the unbridled enthusiasm of the propo-
nents of race-based redistricting that seemed to be de rigeur following the
1990 census, an unusual process is taking place. The embattled propo-
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1. Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After the 2000 Census, 50
STAN. L. REv. 731,733 (1998).
2. See id. at 731.
3. See id. at 734.
4. Id. at 741.
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nents of racial classifications in the electoral process may be marching
into state courts for refuge under the wings of a rejuvenated federalism
and likely deference to state policy choices in the political arena, thus
avoiding the federal judiciary and its perceived unsympathetic attitude
toward racial politics. Indeed, as Professor Karlan noted in her analysis
of the future of voting rights litigation presented at the ABA Annual
Meeting in Atlanta this past August, there may soon be a "premium on
racing to the state, rather than the federal, courthouse" in light of such
Supreme Court guideposts as Growe v. Emison5 and Lawyer v. Depart-
ment of Justice.6
Markedly, the U.S. Supreme Court has been unable to end a term of
court for the past seven years without at least one significant voting
rights case still pending on the docket. For the case currently pending,
Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board,7 the Court has requested additional
briefing on certain section 5 coverage issues, suggesting a blockbuster
opinion when the Court reconvenes in October 1999.8 This is not to say
that the preceding term was all sweetness and light. The 1998 term wit-
nessed a number of significant decisions disposing of racial gerryman-
dering claims, by ruling on the appropriateness of summary judgment in
such cases' and by elaborating on the applicability of section 5's pre-
clearance requirement to a covered jurisdiction located within a non-
covered state.' ° Moreover, the courts of appeals, primarily of the Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits, continue to grapple with such issues as applying
proper legal standards for adjudicating racial gerrymandering claims,
giving proper legal emphasis to minority electoral success, evaluating the
Gingles preconditions (particularly the requirement of geographical
5. 507 U.S. 25 (1993).
6. 521 U.S. 567 (1997).
7. 119 S. Ct. 2390, 2390 (1999) (restoring case to calendar for re-argument).
8. See id. The Court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing the
following questions:
(1) Does the purpose prong of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 extend to a
discriminatory but non-retrogressive purpose? and
(2) Assuming arguendo that § 5 prohibits the implementation of a districting
plan enacted with a discriminatory, non-retrogressive purpose, does the govern-
ment or the covered jurisdiction bear the burden of proof in this issue?
Id.
9. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 119 S. Ct. 1545, 1550, 1552 (1999) (holding that summary
judgment is inappropriate in the absence of uncontroverted evidence that a legislature had
a radical motive when it drew district lines).
10. See Lopez v. Monterey County, 119 S. Ct. 693, 700-05 (1999) (holding that a cov-
ered county must seek preclearance under § 5 before implementing a proposal meeting
the requirements of a non-covered state).
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compactness), and dealing with many of the knotty problems of standing
and assessment of civil rights attorney's fees in redistricting litigation in-
volving dueling claims asserted under the Voting Rights Act and the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.1
Recent appellate decisions shed light on the different approach taken
by the federal courts when it comes to judicial redistricting as opposed to
legislative and other local government redistricting controversies. Some
of these more recent cases are serving also as beacons for the litigators,
for the plaintiff's side, as well as for the defense. After all, it will be these
twenty-first century gladiators who soon will be grappling in the trenches
with questions arising from the census undercount, the potential inaccu-
racy of the official census results, and the evidentiary standards for rec-
onciling the many competing interests at stake in the allocation of politi-
cal power.
I. RACIAL GERRYMANDERING LITIGATION: THE PARTY AIN'T OVER
In what many thought was the closing chapter in the Shaw v. Reno 3
litigation, the U.S. Supreme Court on May 17, 1999, held in Hunt v.
Cromartie14 that the district court in North Carolina had erred in granting
11. See Theriot v. Parish of Jefferson, 185 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 1999); Goosby v. Town
Bd., 180 F.3d 476 (2d Cir. 1999); Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175 (11th Cir.
1999); Mallory v. Ohio, 173 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 1999); Valdespino v. Alamo Heights Indep.
Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 848 (5th Cir. 1999); Solomon v. Liberty County Comm'rs, 166 F.3d
1135 (11th Cir. 1999); Perez v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 165 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 1999);
Ruiz v. City of Santa Maria, 160 F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 1998); Brooks v. Miller, 158 F.3d 1230
(11th Cir. 1998); Bradley v. Work, 154 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 1998); Cousin v. Sundquist, 145
F.3d 818 (6th Cir. 1998); Cleveland County Ass'n for Gov't by the People v. Cleveland
County Bd. of Comm'rs, 142 F.3d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Barnett v. City of Chicago, 141
F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 954 (1998); Askew v. City of Rome, 127
F.3d 1355 (11th Cir. 1997); Hall v. Holder, 117 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 1997); Lewis v. Ala-
mance County, 99 F.3d 600 (4th Cir. 1996). See generally Benjamin E. Griffith, Annual
Report of the Election Law and Reapportionment Subcommittees-Colorblind Jurispru-
dence: The Demise of Racial Rorschachism and Separatism, 30 URB. LAW. 995 (1998).
12. See Davis v. Chiles, 139 F.3d 1414, 1420 (11th Cir. 1998); White v. Alabama, 74
F.3d 1058 (11th Cir. 1996); Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Sessions, 56 F.3d
1281, 1294 (11th Cir. 1995); Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1531 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc);
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 869-71 (5th Cir. 1993)(en
banc) (LULAC). See generally Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, Im-
partiality and Representation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95 (1997); Spencer M.
Taylor, The Settlement of White v. Alabama: Judicial Intervention Into Alabama's At-
Large Judicial Election Scheme, 47 ALA. L. REV. 901 (1996); James Thomas Tucker, Tyr-
anny of the Judiciary: Judicial Dilution of Consent Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 443 (1999).
13. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
14. 119 S. Ct. 1545 (1999).
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summary judgment for the plaintiffs, North Carolina residents, who al-
leged that the North Carolina General Assembly created the 1997 dis-
tricting plan based on racially-motivated criteria. 5 The district court de-
clared in Hunt that the burden was on the plaintiffs to show through
direct or circumstantial evidence, or a combination thereof, that the state
legislature had in fact "subordinated traditional race-neutral districting
principles, including but not limited to compactness, contiguity, and re-
spect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared
interests, to racial considerations." 6 Although the plaintiffs in Hunt had
offered circumstantial evidence in support of their racial gerrymandering
claim, the Supreme Court contended that even if evidence did tend to
support an inference that the state drew the district lines with an imper-
missible racial motive, the plaintiffs had not presented any direct evi-
dence of intent, and, according to the Court, "[tihe legislature's motiva-
tion is itself a factual question.' ' 17 In the lower court, the state had
presented evidence plausibly supporting a political explanation "some-
what better than [] a racial explanation."' 8 The Court concluded that
summary judgment was not appropriate under the facts.
Significantly, a former federal military judge who is viewed by many as
the father of racial gerrymander litigation, Duke Law School Professor
Robinson 0. Everett, was lead counsel in Hunt as well as in Shaw v.
Reno, and the subsequent remands and appeals that have contributed
significantly to the body of case law in this area. 9 In preparation for the
trial on remand in Hunt, which may take place in the fall of 1999, Profes-
sor Everett has advanced a powerful argument that the North Carolina
Legislature created the First and Twelfth Congressional Districts, both
majority-black, predominantly on the basis of racial motivation, as dem-
onstrated by the circumstantial evidence.' ° As part of this evidence, Pro-
fessor Everett notes the impossibility of creating "a geographically ma-
jority-black district in North Carolina" and notes that the First District's
splitting of many cities and counties in order to create a majority black
15. See id. at 1548, 1552.
16. Id. at 1549.
17. Id. at 1550 (citing Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 905 (1996) and Miller v. Johnson,
515 U.S. 900, 910 (1995)).
18. Id. at 1551-52.
19. See id. at 1547 (1999); Hunt, 517 U.S. at 900 (1996); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,
632 (1993).
20. See R. Everett, Racial Gerrymandering: The Last Decade and the Next Millen-
nium, Address at the American Bar Association Presidential Showcase Program 12 (Aug.
9, 1999) (transcript available at the American Bar Association).
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district is a strong indication of racial motive." Unfortunately, points out
Professor Everett, this splitting was done on the basis of an erroneous as-
sumption that it was possible to create a majority-black, geographically
compact district and on the basis of the Department of Justice's demand
that the legislature create such a district.2 Determining racial motivation
in the creation of the Twelfth Congressional District, Professor Everett
observes, is more difficult because over ninety-five percent of African-
American registered voters in North Carolina register and vote as
Democrats.2 According to Everett, the shape and demographics of the
Twelfth District will provide the primary evidentiary basis for proving
that it is an illegal racial gerrymander, but the plaintiffs will offer addi-
tional evidence of a race-based motive as well.24
Professor Everett makes a strong case for the resolution of a number
of related legal issues once Hunt is tried. One issue is whether Shaw v.
Reno is limited to majority-minority districts." There is no reason in
26
equal protection case law, says Professor Everett, for such a limitation.
Another issue that the Supreme Court did not address in Hunt is whether
a legislature is required, when crafting remedial districts, to replace ra-
cially gerrymandered districts, so that all "vestiges" of the racial gerry-
mander are eliminated.27 A final issue that may be resolved at the trial of
Hunt is whether the plaintiffs bear an inappropriately high evidentiary
burden when they are required to prove that race was the state legisla-
ture's "'predominant motive'";2 such a burden may be more than what is
required by equal protection case law such as Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp..29
The Supreme Court's decision in Hunt should have a significant impact
on another case now pending before the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, Chen v. City of Houston.° One of the primary is-
sues presented in Chen is determining the proper standard to be applied
to a party who has the burden of proof in a summary judgment proceed-





25. See id. at 13.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. Id. at 13-14.
29. 429 U.S. 252 (1977); see Everett, supra note 20, at 14.
30. 9 F. Supp. 2d 745 (S.D. Tex. 1998), appeal docketed, No. 98-20440 (5th Cir. 1998).
31. See id. at 748, 754-63.
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cial gerrymandering case on summary judgment, due mainly to the in-
tensely factual nature of any inquiry into legislative motivation,32 so the
district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant in Chen
33
may now be hanging in the balance-a balance that decidedly does not
favor summary judgment in this type of litigation. As Douglas E. Mark-
ham, lead counsel for the Chen appellants, has pointed out, if the appel-
late court upholds the summary judgment motion granted by the Chen
district it may encourage local government bodies to continue the course
of creating undersized minority districts, gathering non-citizens une-
qually in districts, and continuing "to obscure racial motivations with
well-presented, sanitized legislative histories and testimony," as was ac-
complished at the trial level by the City of Houston.-
4
A. Lopez (II) v. Monterey County
On January 20, 1999, the United States Supreme Court addressed for
the second time Monterey County's unprecleared electoral system for
electing county judges.35 This is the kind of case that makes one want to
ask "can I trade this job for what's behind door no. 2?"
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 196536 imposes substantial "fed-
eralism costs" on covered states and political subdivisions by requiring
them to preclear any change in voting qualifications, any change in the
prerequistite to voting, and any change in the standard, practice, or pro-
cedure of voting that they seek to administer.37 This preclearance, when
required, entails a certain amount of federal intrusion into state and local
policymaking; the Fifteenth Amendment permits such an intrusion into
state sovereignty.38 In order to obtain preclearance, a covered jurisdic-
tion may choose the administrative route through a formal submission to
the Attorney General of the United States, or it may choose the judicial
route through a declaratory judgment action, provided the action is
brought in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.39
32. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 119 S. Ct. 1545, 1550,1552 (1999).
33. See Chen, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 763.
34. Douglas E. Markham, Local Government Redistricting After Chen v. City of
Houston, Address Before the American Bar Association Presidential Showcase Program
19 (August 9, 1999).
35. See Lopez v. Monterey County, 119 S. Ct. 693,696 (1999).
36. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994)).
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c; Lopez, 119 S. Ct. at 703 (citing Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S.
900, 926 (1995)).
38. See Lopez, 119 S. Ct. at 703.
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c; Lopez, 119 S. Ct. at 697.
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The extent of these "federalism costs" was recently highlighted in Lo-
pez on its second visit (Lopez II) to the United States Supreme Court.4°
The Lopez litigation arose in a state, California, that has "not been des-
ignated as [a] historical wrongdoer[] in the voting rights sphere;" that is,
California is not a covered state.41 Although California is not a "cov-
ered" jurisdiction under section 5, it is a partially covered one, and Mon-
terey, California, is covered. 42 As noted above, under section 5, a cov-
ered jurisdiction must seek preclearance, and the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia may preclear a proposed voting
change only if it can conclude that the change "does not have the pur-
pose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote
on account of race" or any other impermissible classification.43
In Lopez ,44 the U.S. Supreme Court held that if California enacts
legislation effecting changes in the method for electing county judges,
Monterey County is required to seek section 5 preclearance before it can
give effect to those changes.45 This is true even though the county argua-
bly is just implementing a state law without exercising any independent
discretion. Previously, Monterey County had adopted and implemented
six judicial consolidation ordinances without seeking section 5 preclear-
ance.
Following remand and a second appeal,46 the issue before the U.S. Su-
preme Court in Lopez H was whether Monterey County was required to
pursue section 5 preclearance for state-sponsored and legislatively
authorized voting changes that the county sought to administer.47 The
Court held that a covered political subdivision, when seeking to adminis-
ter a voting change, is required to obtain section 5 preclearance for that
change (1) even where it exercises no independent discretion in giving
effect to a state-mandated voting change, and (2) even when the voting
change it implements is required by the superior law of a non-covered
state.48
In holding that section 5's preclearance requirement applies to a cov-
ered jurisdiction even if the jurisdiction does not exercise discretion or a
40. See Lopez, 119 S. Ct. at 696-701.
41. Lopez, 119 S. Ct. at 703.
42. See id. at 697, 699-700.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c; Lopez, 119 S. Ct. at 697.
44. Lopez v. Monterey County, 519 U.S. 9 (1996).
45. See id. at 14-15, 19-20, 22, 25.
46. See Lopez, 119 S. Ct. at 696.
47. See id. at 701.
48. See id. at 696-701.
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policy choice, the Court emphasized that Congress used the trigger
phrase "'seek to administer"' in the Voting Rights Act to prevent limit-
ing the preclearance requirement to discretionary actions of a covered
jurisdiction.49 On the contrary, according to the Court, section 5 reaches
nondiscretionary actions by covered jurisdictions seeking to comply with
a state's superior law. 0 The Court stressed that when a partially covered
state enacts legislation that affects covered local government entities
such as cities or counties, section 5 preclearance is required. 1 The ma-
jority pointed out that others agree with this interpretation, noting that
the Justice Department received over 1300 submissions for preclearance
from the seven partially covered states, who had assumed evidently that
section 5 preclearance was required whenever a non-covered state effects
voting changes in covered counties." In numerous instances, as the
Court acknowledges, section 5 cases are decided based on the assump-
tion that laws enacted by a partially-covered state must be precleared be-
fore they can take effect in covered political subdivisions. 3 Finally, the
Supreme Court deferred to the Attorney General's interpretation of sec-
tion 5, which was in accord with the Court's interpretation, and found
that section 5's preclearance requirement "applies to a covered county's
nondiscretionary efforts to implement a voting change required by state
law," even though the state itself is not a covered jurisdiction.:
Two years before Lopez II, the Supreme Court decided City of
Monroe v. United States,55 holding that "preclearance of a voting change
included in a statewide law empowered a municipality to implement that
change,56 even though the municipality had failed to preclear a change
in its municipal charter to the same effect. 7 In Lopez II, California un-
successfully argued that because City of Monroe permitted a municipality
to give effect to a statewide law without being required to preclear the
voting change at the municipal level, section 5's preclearance require-
ments could not be triggered unless the covered jurisdiction exercised
49. See id. at 701.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 701-02.
52. See id. at 702.
53. See id. (citing Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1001 n.2 (1994); Shaw v. Reno,
509 U.S. 630, 634 (1993); United States v. Onslow County, 683 F. Supp. 1021, 1024
(E.D.N.C. 1988)).
54. Id.
55. 522 U.S. 34 (1997).
56. Lopez, 119 S. Ct. at 704.
57. See City of Monroe, 522 U.S. at 37.
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some discretion or policy choice." The Supreme Court rejected this ar-
gument, noting that in City of Monroe the Attorney General had already
precleared and approved the voting change as embodied in the statewide
law. 9 Comparing Lopez II and City of Monroe, the voting change that
the City of Monroe sought to enforce had already been precleared, in
contrast to Monterey County's attempt to engage in the discretionless
implementation of state law without first seeking section 5 preclearance.
In conclusion, the Lopez II Court leaves us with the rule that a non-
covered county is required to seek section 5 preclearance before it can
give effect to voting changes required by state law, even though the state
itself is not a covered jurisdiction under section 5.'0
B. Reno v. Bossier Parish (II) School Board
The United States Supreme Court explored in depth the relationship
between sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act in Reno v. Bossier
Parish (I) School Board,61 which held that section 5 preclearance of a
covered jurisdiction's voting standard, practice, or procedure may not be
denied solely on the basis that it violates section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act.'2 The Bossier Parish I Court rejected the Attorney General's posi-
tion that section 2 is effectively incorporated into section 5, but con-
cluded nonetheless, that section 2 evidence of a redistricting plan's dilu-
tive impact may be relevant even though it is not dispositive of a section
5 inquiry.63 Regarding relevant evidence in conducting an inquiry into a
covered jurisdiction's motivation in enacting voting changes and in con-
sidering such evidence, the majority stressed that the analytical frame-
work of Arlington Heights should be looked to for guidance.6,
The opening line of Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Bossier
Parish (I) promised much: "Today we clarify the relationship between §
2 and § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 .... ,65 The Court rejected
the Justice Department's position that section 2 violations may form the
basis for denying section 5 preclearance, a position which, in the words of
the Court, "would inevitably make compliance with § 5 contingent upon
58. See Lopez, 119 S. Ct. at 704.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 705.
61. 520 U.S. 471 (1997).
62. See id. at 485.
63. See id. at 483-85.
64. See id. at 487 (citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1997)).
65. Id. at 474.
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compliance with § 2. '"66 The Court further held that "§ 2 evidence" may
be relevant to prove that a covered jurisdiction had retrogressive intent
and to prove that it enacted a redistricting plan or other electoral change
with a discriminatory purpose:
The fact that a plan has a dilutive impact ... makes it "more
probable" that the jurisdiction adopting that plan acted with an
intent to retrogress than "it would be without the evidence."
To be sure, the link between dilutive impact and intent to retro-
gress is far from direct, but "the basic standard of relevance...
is a liberal one" and one we think is met here.67
Bossier Parish has come back for another visit to the high court. The
Supreme Court has recently noted probable jurisdiction in two cases of
great interest to state and local governments, Reno v. Bossier Parish (II)
School Board8 and Price v. Bossier Parish School Board.69 These two
cases were consolidated because they presented the same issue:70 whether
the Department of Justice should have approved the Bossier Parish,
Louisiana, School Board's redistricting plan.
At the start of this litigation before the district court in 1995, the De-
partment of Justice (DOJ or Justice Department) objected to the plan
under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 on the grounds that the
School Board failed to meet its burden of proving that it enacted the re-
districting plan without a racially discriminatory purpose. 7' DOJ asserted
that the School Board failed to provide adequate explanations for the
absence of black majority school board districts in the plan.72 DOJ also
relied on hearsay evidence that gave the impression that School Board
members did not favor creation of such districts. 73 Finally, the Justice
Department asserted that the School Board's plan would clearly violate
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and therefore, under Justice Depart-
66. Id. at 477.
67. Id. at 486-87 (citation omitted).
68. 119 S. Ct. 899 (1999) (noting probable jurisdiction).
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. See Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. v. Reno, 907 F. Supp. 434, 440,445-46 (D.D.C. 1995).
72. See id. at 449. The court explained:
Defendant here, as it did in Miller, pursues a theory the result of which is that no
political subdivision presented with a plan that provides for x number of major-
ity-black districts can ever adequately explain its reasons for adopting a plan that
provides for x minus n majority-black districts. The Miller court rejected this
theory of section 5, and we will not resuscitate it here.
Id. at 450.
73. See id. at 448.
[Vol. 49:31
Redistricting Litigation in the Next Millennium
ment regulations, would violate section 5 as well.74
A three-judge court in the District of Columbia held that DOJ should
have approved the plan.75 The court reasoned that the Department had
no authority under section 5 to object to redistricting plans that the De-
76
partment believed violated section 2. In addition, the Court declared
that evidence that a plan violates section 2 is not admissible in a pro-
ceeding under section 5 to prove the existence of a discriminatory pur-
77pose.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court in Bossier Parish I va-
cated and remanded, agreeing with the district court that DOJ could not
object to plans under section 5 merely because it believed they violated
section 2, but disagreeing with the district court that section 2 evidence
cannot be offered to prove discriminatory purpose under section 5 .T
On remand, a three-judge court again ruled in favor of the School
Board.79 The court determined that section 5's prohibition on plans en-
acted with a discriminatory purpose basically proscribed only those plans
adopted with a "retrogressive" intent, i.e., an intent to decrease the po-
litical power of protected minority groups, and, using the Arlington
Heights factors, found no evidence of retrogression.' ° The Department of
Justice and minority intervenors filed separate appeals to the Supreme
Court and, as noted above, the Supreme Court has noted probable juris-
diction and has consolidated the two appeals.
Bossier Parish II presents a question of great significance for state and
local governments subject to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. If the
Supreme Court affirms the district court and finds that section 5's pur-
pose requirement applies only to plans adopted with a retrogressive in-
tent, the state and local governments will have a much easier time com-
plying with section 5 than they have had previously. If, on the other
hand, the Supreme Court reverses and adopts the Department's position,
state and local governments will continue to be subject to pressure from
the Department to create additional minority districts.
On June 24, 1999, the Supreme Court restored Bossier Parish II to the
calendar for re-argument, and requested the parties to file supplemental
74. See id. at 441,444.
75. See id. at 450.
76. See id. at 444.
77. See id. at 445 ("[Sjection 2 and its standards have no place in a section 5 preclear-
ance action.").
78. See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 483, 486 (1997).
79. See Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. v. Reno, 7 F. Supp. 2d 29,30 (D.D.C. 1998).
80. See id. at 31-32.
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briefs addressing whether the purpose prong of section 5 covers a dis-
criminatory but non-retrogressive purpose, and if so, who bears the bur-
den of proof."
C. Ambivalent? Well, Yes and No
The hobby of predicting the Supreme Court's opinions, particularly in
the face of multiple trips to the high court and post-argument requests
for additional briefing, is right up there with high-wire acts sans safety
net and other somewhat hazardous occupations. Bear in mind that the
Supreme Court has "consistently interpreted" section 5's discriminatory
purpose language in light of the evident statutory intent to prevent retro-
gressive electoral changes.82 But, eventually this interpretation may be
extended; the Justice Department argued in the initial brief that section 5
is not limited to changes in voting laws with a retrogressive purpose or
effect, but that it also prohibits changes that have the purpose of diluting
minority voting strength,83 and the Supreme Court in Bossier Parish I
"[left] open for another day the question whether the [section] 5 purpose
inquiry ever extends beyond the search for retrogressive intent."" We
will have to wait and see whether the Supreme Court is planning to ex-
tend the reach of section 5 to districting plans devoid of evidence of ret-
rogression, but enacted with a discriminatory purpose.
In Beer v. United States," which explores the standard of non-
retrogression, the Justice Department was empowered to deny preclear-
ance if a redistricting plan would lead to retrogression in the position of
racial minorities, or to put it another way, if a redistricting plan was likely
to cause fewer minority representatives to be elected than before. While
Beer made it clear that the test for section 5 was non-retrogression, not
maximization of minority districts, the Justice Department had urged in
Shaw v. Hunt86 that maximization of minority districts was also part of
the test,g' which is consistent with its position in Bossier Parish I and H.
Beer set forth the non-retrogression standard in the following words:
[A] legislative reapportionment that enhances the position of
81. See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2390, 2390 (1999); Price v. Bossier
Parish Sch. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2390, 2390 (1999).
82. Bossier Parish, 520 U.S. at 486-87.
83. See Brief for Appellant, Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., Nos. 98-405 and 98-406,
1999 WL 133834, at *15, *16 (Mar. 5,1999).
84. Bossier Parish, 520 U.S. at 486.
85. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
86. 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
87. See 517 U.S. at 913.
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racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the
electoral franchise can hardly have the "effect" of diluting or
abridging the right to vote on account of race within the mean-
ing of [section] 5. We conclude, therefore, that such an amelio-
rative new legislative apportionment cannot violate [section] 5
unless the new apportionment itself so discriminates on the ba-
sis of race or color as to violate the Constitution. 8
Thus, an electoral change that enhances minority voting is not retro-
gressive. City of Lockhart v. United States89 further broadened the appli-
cation of the retrogression standard. In City of Lockhart, the Supreme
Court upheld preclearance of an electoral change that did not improve,
but also did not diminish, the position of minority voters. The Court rea-
soned that "[a]lthough there may have been no improvement in [minor-
ity] voting strength, there has been no retrogression either,"9 and be-
cause the new electoral change did not "increase the degree of
discrimination against blacks,"" it is entitled to preclearance under sec-
tion 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
It was on this point that Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented in City of
Lockhart, chastising the majority for reducing "[section] 5 to a means of
maintaining the status quo," insofar as it held that section 5 "forbids only
electoral changes that increase discrimination." 92 Justice Marshall's criti-
cism of the majority was that such a view of the retrogression standard
would permit a jurisdiction to adopt "a discriminatory election scheme,
so long as the scheme is not more discriminatory than its predecessor," a
view and approach that Justice Marshall condemned as "inconsistent
with both the language and purpose" of section 5.93
One may surmise that the Supreme Court is now struggling with an is-
sue previously addressed, at least indirectly, by the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia in Busbee v. Smith.94 The district
court held in Busbee that an electoral plan that is not retrogressive may
nonetheless be denied section 5 preclearance if the submitting jurisdic-
tion cannot prove an absence of discriminatory purpose.95 The Supreme
Court affirmed without opinion.96 Given the lack of any clear delineation
88. Beer, 425 U.S. at 141.
89. 460 U.S. 125 (1983).
90. Id. at 135.
91. Id. at 134.
92. Id. at 137 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part).
93. Id.
94. 549 F. Supp. 494 (D.D.C. 1982), affd mem., 459 U.S. 1166 (1983).
95. See id. at 518.
96. See Busbee v. Smith, 459 U.S. 1166 (1983) (mem.).
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of the precise factors necessary for the Justice Department to find such a
discriminatory purpose, it may be that the Supreme Court's opinion in
Bossier Parish II will provide just such clarification.
II. THE ROLE AND EVIDENTIARY IMPACT OF MINORITY ELECTORAL
SUCCESS
On February 3, 1999, the Eleventh Circuit decided Solomon v. Liberty
County Commissioners.97 In that case, the district court upheld Liberty
County's at-large system in the face of a section 2 vote dilution challenge,
relying on the electoral success of a sole black county commissioner to
support its finding of no vote dilution.9 The Eleventh Circuit reversed
and remanded, holding that such reliance on a single instance of minority
electoral success was clearly erroneous.99 First, explained the Court, the
burden is upon the county, not the section 2 plaintiffs, to prove that the
black commissioner's single instance of electoral success had probative
value; second, given this burden on the county defendants to prove that
the black candidate was "in fact, the black candidate of choice," by prof-
fering only the election results the county defendants failed to meet that
burden as a matter of law.' °° In speaking for the divided panel, Circuit
Judge Hatchett reasoned:
Unquestionably, mere proof of Jennings's race could not sup-
port a finding that he was the choice of black voters. Impor-
tantly, appellees did not proffer any statistical analysis at the
second trial. Nor could appellees rely on pre-en banc statistical
evidence concerning Jennings to show that he was the black
candidate of choice. Even the original appellate panel consid-
ered that evidence to be of little value.101
After giving minimal weight to evidence of black electoral success in
Solomon, the Eleventh Circuit buttressed its rejection of this evidence by
citing precedent from the dawning years of what would come to be
steadily increasing and substantial minority participation and access. For
example, the court cited NAACP v. Gadsden County School Board,' °2 a
1982 case in which a single black candidate was elected in an at-large
school board election after the plaintiffs had filed their voting rights law-
suit; the Eleventh Circuit chastised the district court in the case for at-
97. 166 F.3d 1135 (11th Cir. 1999).
98. See id. at 1138.
99. See id. at 1146.
100. Id. at 1145.
101. Id. (citations omitted).
102. 691 F.2d 978 (11th Cir. 1982).
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taching "inordinate significance" to this electoral evidence 03 The Elev-
enth Circuit also cited and relied upon United States v. Marengo County
Commission,'4 in which the court had, over fifteen years earlier, dis-
counted the probative value of a black candidate's election and re-
election to a county office in an at-large system.05 The divided Eleventh
Circuit relied additionally upon McMillan v. Escambia County, Florida,'6
to suggest that the court could appropriately disregard or "not even con-
sider the at-large election of one black county commissioner during the
pendency of litigation."' 7
The Eleventh Circuit's biggest surprise, however, was buried in foot-
note seven of Solomon'0 The court in Solomon struggled to distinguish
this evidentiary blockade of minority electoral success from its decision
less than two years before in Askew v. City of Rome,1°9 a per curiam deci-
sion in which the voters in Rome, Georgia elected a black candidate
prior to litigation and the court required the section 2 plaintiffs to bear
the burden of discounting minority electoral success."1 In Solomon,
Judge Hatchett examines this unique approach to evidentiary consistency
in voting rights litigation, but his disregard of the holding and clear
analysis in City of Rome is not persuasive. Indeed, when Judge Hatchett
noted in footnote seven of the Solomon decision that "[alt first blush,
this case may appear to contradict Askew v. City of Rome,.. he could
have stopped right there because of the difficulty in reconciling the two
cases.
III. THE SEARCH FOR A GEOGRAPHICALLY COMPACT MAJORITY
A pair of cases recently decided by the Fifth Circuit focus on the geo-
graphical compactness prong of the test enunciated by Thornberg v. Gin-
gles.12 The first of these cases is Perez v. Pasadena Independent School
District,"3 in which the Fifth Circuit holds that Hispanic citizens chal-
103. See Solomon, 166 F.3d at 1146.
104. 731 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 976 (1984).
105. See id. at 1574-75.
106. 748 F.2d 1037 (5th Cir. 1984).
107. Solomon, 166 F.3d at 1146 (citing McMillan, 748 F.2d at 1045 n.20).
108. See id. at 1146 n.7.
109. 127 F.3d 1355 (11th Cir. 1997).
110. Accord City of Rome, 127 F.3d at 1374, 1380-1384; see Solomon, 166 F.3d at 1146
n.7.
111. Solomon, 166 F.3d at 1146 n.7.
112. 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986) (detailing the test's criteria).
113. 165 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3684 (Apr. 29,
1999) (No. 98-17).
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lenging the at-large voting system for electing school board members
failed to prove the geographic compactness precondition set forth in
Gingles.1  Rejected at the trial court level, plaintiffs contended on ap-
peal that the district judge had erroneously established a "bright line"
rule, requiring the Hispanic residents to demonstrate that a majority of
the citizen voting-age population in a proposed single member district
was Hispanic."' At trial, the plaintiffs attempted to satisfy the Gingles
test by arguing that the majority of the citizen voting-age population in
the proposed district was Hispanic. The plaintiffs also pointed to the
growing Hispanic population with a demographic composition similar to
that of districts in which Hispanic candidates had been elected."6 On ap-
peal, the plaintiffs argued that the district court erred in finding that the
majority of the citizen voting-age population in those proposed districts
was not Hispanic, particularly in view of the evidence of future growth.
117
The Fifth Circuit rejected this contention, noting that the trial court
had correctly required the section 2 plaintiffs to demonstrate that His-
panics would represent a majority of voting-age citizens in a proposed
district. According to its own formula, the lower court held that the
plaintiffs did not satisfy this requirement by showing that the proposed
districts contained an Hispanic voting-age population exceeding fifty
percent.' The Fifth Circuit panel pointed out the plain language of sec-
tion 2 and unequivocally required consideration of the citizen voting-age
population of the group in "determining whether a minority group is suf-
ficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority.
19
Moreover, even if the plaintiffs had been able to show that Hispanics
had the ability to elect candidates of their choice, they could not have
satisfied the geographic compactness requirement set forth in Gingles if
they comprised less than a majority of voting-age citizens in a proposed
district. Faced with the plaintiffs' claim that Hispanics represented a
growing percentage of the total population and that Hispanic candidates
had succeeded in similar districts, the Fifth Circuit nonetheless concluded
that "evidence that the group may succeed in electing preferred candi-
114. See id. at 370-71 (defining geographical compactness as the point when the mi-
nority group was sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a
single-member district).
115. See id. at 372.
116. See id. at 373.
117. See id. (noting that only 60% of the Hispanic resident population in the school
district are citizens, forcing the court to determine the proper percentage of Hispanics
needed to constitute a majority).
118. See id. at 371-72.
119. Id. at 372.
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dates cannot remedy its failure to meet the Gingles threshold."' 2 ° In af-
firming the district court's judgment for defendants on the section 2
claim, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court properly weighed the
evidence and adopted the 1990 census data as the most reliable. The
Fifth Circuit also found that the plaintiffs' projections of growth of the
Hispanic population were unreliable and that "the percentage of His-
panics voting in the [school district] and in elections in similar districts
had remained essentially unchanged since 1990 [with the growth rate of]
Hispanic voter registration [increasing] at a slower rate than the plain-
tiffs' Hispanic citizen growth projections.'
121
In the second case, Valdespino v. Alamo Heights Independent School
District,'22 the Fifth Circuit again affirmed a district court's ruling. Mi-
nority voters failed to prove that their minority group exceeded fifty per-
cent of the relevant population in the proposed district to meet the Gin-
gles threshold requirement of geographical compactness.23  In
Valdespino, the proposed "demonstration district" did in fact "comprise
a majority of Hispanic voting age citizens according to 1990 census
data. 1 24 The school district responded that demographic changes be-
tween the 1990 census and the 1997 trial had eliminated that majority.
As a result, the plaintiffs tripped over the "bright line" test of fifty per-
cent Hispanic voting age citizens in their demonstration district, and
failed to establish the Gingles threshold requirements for a section 2
violation.'25
The Fifth Circuit panel held that a section 2 plaintiff's failure to estab-
lish any one of the Gingles threshold requirements was fatal, 26 and that
unless all three factors were established, "there neither has been a wrong
nor can be a remedy.' '127 Harkening back to the Gingles requirement that
plaintiffs demonstrate a "majority,"' 2 the Fifth Circuit held the plaintiffs
to the strict requirement that they carried the burden of showing that
Hispanic citizens exceded fifty percent of the relevant population in their
120. Id. at 373.
121. Id.
122. 168 F.3d 848 (5th Cit. 1999), petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3779 (Jun. 9,
1999) (No 98-1987).
123. See id. at 850.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 852 (quoting Campos v. City of Houston, 113 F.3d 544, 547 (5th Cir.
1997)); see also Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40-41 (1993); Rangel v. Morales, 8 F.3d 242,
249 (5th Cir. 1993); Overton v. City of Austin, 871 F.2d 529, 538 (5th Cir. 1989).
126. See Valdespino, 168 F.3d at 852.
127. Id. (quoting Growe, 507 U.S. at 40-41).
128. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1996).
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proposed "demonstration district. '
Turning to the school board's evidence countering the plaintiffs' cen-
sus data, the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's exclusion of the
plaintiffs' proposed rebuttal evidence, finding that the parties were es-
sentially in agreement about the standard to use in overcoming census
data.3° To evaluate whether the district court properly found that the
school board's 1997 population data had overcome the 1990 census fig-
ures, the Fifth Circuit cited Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,"' where the Supreme
Court upheld a state's consideration of post-census population shifts in
redistricting, provided its findings were "thoroughly documented and
applied throughout the state in a systematic, not an ad hoc, manner.',
132
The Fifth Circuit also noted that in Karcher v. Daggett,133 the Supreme
Court had said that "in reapportionment, a state cannot 'correct' census
figures 'in a haphazard, inconsistent, or conjectural manner."" 4
The Fifth Circuit also discussed two of its earlier decisions. Westwego
Citizens for Better Government v. City of Westwego131 "opened the door
to the use of non-census data when census data are not sufficiently pro-
bative of the voting-age proportion of a population.',3 6 Also, less than
two weeks before Valdespino, in Perez v. Pasadena Independent School
District,137 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that the
plaintiffs' population projection was too unreliable to overcome 1990
census data.1
38
Based on these Fifth Circuit decisions, the Fifth Circuit found in
Valdespino that the district court did not clearly err in admitting the
school district's evidence suggesting the inaccuracy of the census data in
this case. Addressing the school district's demographic methodology, the
Fifth Circuit reasoned that the data involved in this case were "relatively
simple" and the manipulation entailed only "rudimentary arithmetic.' '3 9
Further, the Gingles geographical compactness issues in this case "do not
involve any complicated statistical formulae or tests of significance that
129. Valdespino, 168 F.3d. at 853.
130. See id. at 853,855.
131. 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
132. Id. at 535.
133. 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
134. Valdespino, 168 F.3d at 854 (citing Karcher, 462 U.S. at 732 n.4).
135. 906 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1990).
136. See Valdespino, 168 F.3d at 854 (citing Westwego, 906 F.2d at 1045 n.3).
137. 165 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 1999).
138. See id. at 371.
139. Valdespino, 168 F.3d at 854.
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might bedazzle or bamboozle an unwary district court., 140
On this basis, the Fifth Circuit panel pronounced that the defendant
school district's expert provided a clear and convincing demonstration of
"sufficient post-census demographic changes to erode the Hispanic ma-
jority in the Plaintiffs' demonstration district,' , 41 utilizing a methodology
much more sophisticated than the "crude straight-line population projec-
tion that was rejected in Perez.,
142
The Fifth Circuit also found that the district court properly rejected
the section 2 plaintiffs' proposed rebuttal evidence concerning post-
census populations on the ground of unfair surprise because the plaintiffs
failed to supplement their expert disclosures as required by local rules.143
In sum, the Fifth Circuit concluded that it was proper for the district
court to saddle the section 2 plaintiffs with the burden of proving a ma-
jority of Hispanics among voting age citizens resided in their "demon-
stration district," and that the district court properly found that the de-
fendant school board presented sufficient evidence to show that




A recent decision by the U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan provides a brief but accurate textbook example of the impor-
tance of establishing the "irreducible constitutional minimum of stand-
ing" for purposes of asserting constitutional claims in vote dilution litiga-
tion. In Anthony v. Michigan,"' individual registered voters and
several minority organizations challenged the merger of the Recorder's
Court for the City of Detroit with the Wayne County Circuit Court. 47
The controversy related to a statute enacted by the Michigan legislature
abolishing the Recorder's Court, and making the judges of that court
Wayne County Circuit Court judges 48 The plaintiffs in Anthony claimed
that the merger violated their Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 854-55 (applying Perez v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 958 F. Supp. 1196,
1212-13 (S.D. Tex. 1997), affd, 165 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 1999)).
143. See id. at 855.
144. See id. at 855-56.
145. Anthony v. Michigan, 35 F. Supp. 2d 989, 1002-03 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
146. 35 F. Supp. 2d at 989.
147. See Anthony, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 991.
148. See id.
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rights because it was motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose, and
that the merger also violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act because
the white majority in Wayne County was guilty of racial bloc voting that
defeated the preferred candidates of black voters in the Wayne County
Circuit Court elections. 149 The court granted the State's motion for sum-
mary judgment, holding that with respect to the constitutional claims, the
plaintiffs did not have standing as to voters residing in the City of De-
troit, because they had failed to establish that they suffered an injury in
fact as a result of the merger of these two courts.5° The district court,
citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,15" ' addressed the standing issue by
holding that the individual plaintiffs failed to satisfy Lujan's three ele-
ments for standing.'52 The district court held that it was an indispensable
part of the organizational plaintiffs' case to, at a minimum, make out a
question of material fact as to each of the elements for organizational
standing; first, that the members of the organization would "otherwise
have standing to sue in their own right"; second, that the interests that
the organization seeks to protect are "germane" to the purpose of that
organization; and third, that "neither the claim asserted nor the relief re-
quested require[d] the participation of individual members in [this] law-
suit."'53 The district court found that the plaintiffs' generalized complaint
was insufficient to establish a question of fact with regard to standing,
reasoning that
Plaintiffs do not articulate how they are particularly harmed as
a result of the merger, and the record is devoid of evidence of a
concrete and particularized injury to either the individual or or-
ganizational plaintiffs. Though plaintiffs are or have members
that are registered voters residing in the City of Detroit, plain-
tiffs proffer no evidence that any of them ran unsuccessfully for
the Wayne County Circuit Court in any past election, plan to
run for the Wayne County Circuit Court in any future election,
149. See id.
150. See id. at 1003.
151. 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); Anthony, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1002 (holding that neither
the individual plaintiff nor the organizational plaintiffs, including the NAACP, the Na-
tional Bar Association, the National Conference of Black Lawyers, and the Legal Aid De-
fender Association, had standing to assert and bring these constitutional claims).
152. Anthony, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1002 (including the requirement that the plaintiffs
must have suffered an injury in fact, that there be a "causal connection between the injury
and the conduct complained of," and that "it must be 'likely,' as opposed to merely
'speculative,' that the injury [would be] 'redressed by a favorable decision"') (quoting
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61).
153. Id. at 1002-3 (citing Hunt v. Washington Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333,
343 (1977)).
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have a criminal jury trial pending in Wayne County Circuit
Court, or even that they have supported an unsuccessful candi-
date for the Wayne County Circuit Court in the past. Further,
neither the individual nor the organizational plaintiffs seem to
be the object of the government action.
The essence of the plaintiff's claim, unsupported by evidence, was that
the legislation merging these two courts was "an attempt to keep black
judges off the bench" and to "dilute" the presence of black jurors in
criminal cases that would have otherwise been tried in the Recorder's
Court, and that the "impetus" for abolishing the Recorder's Court and
merging it with the Wayne County Circuit Court "is to insure that Afri-
can American judges, such as Dalton Robertson, are not allowed to
make determinations in relation to crimes allegedly committed by Afri-
can-Americans against white suburbanites within the City of Detroit." '
The district court properly concluded that the plaintiffs' claimed inju-
ries were conjectural rather than concrete and particularized, and that
they had failed to establish that either they or members in their organiza-
tion had a "sufficient personal stake in the outcome of the Wayne
County Circuit Court races to have standing.', 5 6 The court dismissed the
constitutional claims for lack of standing, stating that "[p]laintiffs' argu-
ment for standing is essentially that the merger is unfair because it was
motivated by a racial animus in the majority of the Michigan legislators
who voted in favor of Public Act 374 of 1996, and presumably the gover-
nor who signed it.'
15 7
V. JUDICIAL REDISTRICTING
In Mallory v. Ohio,"8 the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's rejec-
tion of a section 2 challenge to Ohio's at-large electoral system for judges
in eight of its largest counties. Commending the district court for a
"carefully written, solidly reasoned, and extremely comprehensive opin-
ion," the Sixth Circuit addressed the Gingles preconditions in the context
of a challenge to a judicial redistricting plan."9
With respect to geographical compactness, the plaintiff class failed to
prove that a majority-minority district with a rational shape could be
drawn in fourteen of the eighteen challenged judicial districts, although




158. 173 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 1999).
159. Id. at 380 (citing Mallory v. Ohio, 38 F. Supp. 2d 525 (S.D. Ohio 1997)).
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the class satisfied the geographic compactness requirement as to the re-
maining four districts.' 6° The plaintiff class took issue with the finding in
the fourteen other judicial districts. The Sixth Circuit noted, however,
that the only evidence submitted by the plaintiffs to demonstrate com-
pactness was a set of maps purportedly showing the concentration of
black populations within each of the largest counties in the state, and
these maps neither demonstrated the number of whites within the rele-
vant areas nor signified the relevant census tracks, information usually
needed to draw an electoral district.1 61 In the face of the plaintiffs' "bare
conclusion" that the district court erred, the Sixth Circuit upheld the dis-
trict court's determination that the plaintiff class failed to meet its burden
of demonstrating that geographically compact, single-member districts
could be traced in which blacks would constitute a majority in these four-
teen other districts. 62
The next Gingles precondition is minority political cohesion; that is,
that "the minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohe-• ,,163in
sive. In the instant case, the plaintiff class could only point to conclu-
sory trial testimony by its witnesses that "blacks tend to vote for blacks
and whites tend to vote for whites," unsupported by any statistical evi-
dence, any statistical examination of racial bloc voting, or any analysis of
all of the challenged districts. 64 On the other hand, Ohio's witness, Har-
vard Professor Gary King, one of the world's foremost authorities on sta-
tistical analysis of racial bloc voting, noted that there was an absence of
legally significant racially polarized voting in any of the districts in ques-
tion and that the evidence did not show a consensus "candidate of
choice" among blacks in the challenged districts. Moreover, "the degree
of racial bloc voting varied widely from election to election, and that
candidates supported by African-Americans were routinely supported by
significant numbers of Caucasian voters.' 161 Professor King also pointed
to many elections won by black candidates through considerable support,
sometimes even by a majority, of white voters.' 66 The Sixth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's acceptance of the state's version of facts based
upon Professor King's "valid, comprehensive scientific study," as op-
posed to the plaintiffs' proffered "unscientific report on a single judicial
160. See Mallory, 173 F.3d at 382.
161. See id. at 382-83.
162. See id. at 383.
163. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 51 (1986).
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district and the subjective experience of several voters.'
167
With regard to the third Gingles precondition of racial bloc voting, the
Sixth Circuit noted that the plaintiff class presented no evidence other
than unsubstantiated testimony of various black voters. On the other
hand, the state's expert, Professor King, did not find any evidence of "le-
gally significant racially polarized bloc voting."' ' The Sixth Circuit up-
held the district court's finding that the plaintiff class did not bear its
burden of proving white racial bloc voting. 69
The Sixth Circuit then turned to a number of conclusory arguments
that, charitably described, were "only tangentially related to the Gingles
preconditions.' ' 70 First, the plaintiff class argued that the state's electoral
system created a "chilling effect," discouraging blacks from running for
judicial office. 7' The district court rejected this reasoning because
candidates who do not run cannot be elected [; therefore,] it is
impossible to statistically measure this so-called chilling effect.
Although conceding that this statement is technically accurate,
the class labels it "cynical," and accuses the district court of a
"lack of understanding of the continuing impact of racially dis-
criminatory practices" that, when "coupled with patterns of
consistent racial bloc voting," deters "African-Americans from
fully participating in the judicial electoral process.'
7
Noting that the plaintiff class failed to provide any legal support for the
chilling effect argument and cited no authority that a section 2 claim
could be established without statistical evidence of racial bloc voting, the
Sixth Circuit rejected as meritless the plaintiff's class claims that the dis-
trict court erred in disregarding elections in which blacks did not partici-
pate."' Moreover, the Sixth Circuit refused to follow the approach used
by the Eleventh Circuit and the Fifth Circuit that district courts are re-
quired to consider the possibility that "African-Americans do not run
because they cannot win," noting that even if the Sixth Circuit adopted
such a theory, "it would only apply in a case where there was evidence
that African-Americans could not win. Here, the evidence shows exactly
the opposite.
' 174
167. Id. at 384.
168. Id. at 383.




173. See id. at 384-85.
174. Id. at 385.
1999]
Catholic University Law Review
VI. PROOF OF CAUSATION OF RACIALLY DIVERGENT VOTING
The Fifth Circuit addressed the problem of the entanglement of race
and politics, in the context of determining whether section 2 plaintiffs
have established legally significant white racial bloc voting and sufficient
probative evidence of racially polarized voting to establish a section 2
vote dilution claim in League of United Latin American Citizens v.
Clements.7 1 Writing for the majority, Judge Patrick Higginbotham said
that in establishing racial bloc voting and racial polarization, a section 2
plaintiff must show, at a minimum, that racially divergent voting was not
primarily caused by or the result of partisan politics:
On appeal, defendants contend that the district court erred in
refusing to consider the nonracial causes of voting preferences
they offered at trial. Unless the tendency among minorities and
whites to support different candidates, and the accompanying
losses by minority groups at the polls, are somehow tied to race,
defendants argue, plaintiffs' attempt to establish legally signifi-
cant white bloc voting, and thus their vote dilution claim under
§ 2, must fail. When the record indisputably proves that parti-
san affiliation, not race, best explains the divergent voting pat-
terns among minority and white citizens in the contested coun-
ties, defendants conclude, the district court's judgment must be
reversed.
We agree. The scope of the Voting Rights Act is indeed quite
broad, but its rigorous protections, as the text of § 2 suggests,
extend only to defeats experienced by voters "on account of
race or color." Without an inquiry into the circumstances un-
derlying unfavorable election returns, courts lack the tools to
discern results that are in any sense "discriminatory," and any
distinction between deprivation and mere losses at the polls be-
comes untenable. In holding that the failure of minority-
preferred candidates to receive support from a majority of
whites on a regular basis, without more, sufficed to prove le-
gally significant racial bloc voting, the district court loosed § 2
from its racial tether and fused illegal vote dilution and political
defeat. 76
The Fifth Circuit also addressed the concern that it was erecting some
type of new requirement for section 2 plaintiffs to prove minority elec-
toral failure resulting from racial motivation:
We need not hold that plaintiffs must supply conclusive proof
175. 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
176. Id. at 850.
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that a minority group's failure to elect representatives of its
choice is caused by racial animus in the white electorate in or-
der to decide that the district court's judgment must be re-
versed. It is true that such a requirement could be inferred
from the text of § 2... the caselaw Congress intended to codify
in amending the provision,... the Senate Report .... the testi-
mony of prominent supporters of the Act,.. . and the control-
ling opinions of the Supreme Court .... There is also a power-
ful argument supporting a rule that plaintiffs, to establish legally
significant racial bloc voting, must prove that their failure to
elect representatives of their choice cannot be characterized as
a "mere euphemism for political defeat at the polls," . . . or the
"result" of "partisan politics .... .
Describing plaintiffs' burden in terms of negating "partisan
politics" rather than affirmatively proving "racial animus"
would not be simply a matter of nomenclature .... [T]here are
many other possible non-racial causes of voter behavior beyond
partisan affiliation. A rule conditioning relief under § 2 upon
proof of the existence of racial animus in the electorate would
require plaintiffs to establish the absence of not only partisan
voting, but also all other potentially innocent explanations for
white voters' rejection of minority-preferred candidates. Fac-
tors that might legitimately lead white voters to withhold sup-
port from particular minority candidates include, for example,
limited campaign funds, inexperience, or a reputation be-
smirched by scandal. Because these additional factors map only
imperfectly into partisan affiliation, detailed multivariate analy-
sis might then be the evidence of choice. The argument would
then be that without this additional inquiry, courts that confine
their scrutiny to partisan voting might well find racial bloc vot-
ing in circumstances where the losses of minority-preferred
candidates were actually attributable to causes other than race.
This result, it is urged, might unfairly tip the scales in favor of
liability.
This argument possesses considerable force. Certainly, the al-
location of proof in § 2 cases must reflect the central purpose of
the Voting Rights Act and its intended liberality as well as the
practical difficulties of proof in the real world of trial. In
countless areas of the law weighty legal conclusions frequently
rest on methodologies that would make scientists blush . . ..
Requiring plaintiffs affirmatively to establish that white voters'
rejection of minority-preferred candidates was motivated by ra-
cial animus would make racial bloc voting both difficult and,
considering the additional analysis that would be needed, ex-
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pensive to establish .... Moreover, it would facilitate the use
of thinly-veiled proxies by permitting, for example, evidence
that a minority candidate was regarded as "unqualified" or
'corrupt" to defeat a claim that white voters' refusal to support
him was based on race or ethnicity. The argument continues
that an inquiry into causation beyond partisan affiliation seems
inconsistent with the fundamental division between "partisan
politics" and "racial vote dilution" ..... Having said this, we
need not resolve the debate today. Whether or not the burden
of the plaintiffs to prove bloc voting includes the burden to ex-
plain partisan influence, the result is the same. This is so even if
the partisan voting is viewed as a defensive parry.
Finally, we recognize that even partisan affiliation may serve as
a proxy for illegitimate racial considerations. Minority voters, at
least those residing in the contested counties in this case, have
tended uniformly to support the Democratic Party. At the
same time, a majority of white voters in most counties have
consistently voted for district court candidates fielded by the
Republican Party. Noting this persistent, albeit imperfect cor-
relation between party and race, plaintiffs assert that a determi-
nation that partisan affiliation best explains voting patterns
should not foreclose § 2 liability in this case because the Re-
publican and Democratic Parties are proxies for racial and eth-
nic groups in Texas. Whitcomb's distinction between "racial
vote dilution" and "political defeat at the polls" should not con-
trol, they contend, for "partisan politics" is "racial politics."' 77
One of the most recent cases addressing this causation issue comes
from the Second Circuit, Goosby v. Town Board.17 The Second Circuit
upheld the district court's ruling that found that Town of Hempstead's
at-large voting method for election of Town Board members violated
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and that a proposed remedial plan
consisting of one single-member district and one multi-member district
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
79
It helps to put this case in perspective. The Town of Hempstead had a
population of over 725,000, awarding it the most populous town in the
United States,'80 a traditional Republican stronghold consisting of
twenty-two villages and thirty-four unincorporated areas in the western-
177. Id. at 859-60.
178. 180 F.3d 476 (2d Cir. 1999).
179. See id. at 497-98.
180. See id. at 483.
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most part of Nassau County, Long Island.' Hempstead was predomi-
nantly white, with a black population of 3.4 percent in 1960, growing to
5.8 percent in 1970, 9.3 percent in 1980, and 12.1 percent in 1990; the
black population was concentrated in one area of the town."
1
The Town Board presented a regression analysis to study the relation-
ship between partisanship and race, showing that candidates received
similar levels of support from the voters without regard to race.'83 When
Curtis Fisher, the only black person ever to sit on the Town Board, ran
for office, "the level of support he received from white voters was similar
to that received by white Republican candidates for Town Board."'
1
This supported the Town's conclusion ultimately that "though there was
a pattern of racially polarized voting in the Town, there was a stronger
pattern of voting along partisan lines." '185 The plaintiffs' expert testified
that there was white bloc voting in the town and found that black-
preferred candidates would have been more successful if they ran in a
majority black district as opposed to at-large."' The plaintiffs' expert
also used "ecological correlation and regression analysis" as well as "ex-
treme case analysis" to support the conclusion that voting was split along
racial lines in each of the Town Board elections.' Another expert for
the plaintiff presented electoral data from elections between 1983 and
1993 revealing that "the white Republican majority consistently defeats
the Democratic candidates, who are supported by the black minority."'
8
Given this conflict in the expert testimony, the Second Circuit noted
"both sides agree that there is polarized voting but dispute its cause."
189
The primary issue on appeal was whether the third Gingles precondi-
tion of white racial bloc voting had been satisfied; that is, whether "the
white majority [of the Town of Hempstead] vote[d] sufficiently as a bloc
usually to defeat the preferred candidate of the minority."' 9 The district
court found racially polarized voting from the following fact that black
voters favored a black democratic candidate running for Town Board,
the black Democrat received over fifty percent of the black vote in every
election except one, there was at least one minority-preferred candidate
181. See id. at 483-84.
182. See id. at 484.
183. See id. at 490.
184. Id.
185. Id.




190. Id. at 492.
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in every Town Board election, and every minority-preferred candidate
for the Town Board lost to the majority-preferred candidate because
white voters voted for candidates not supported by black voters.19'
The core of the Town's argument on appeal was that political partisan-
ship caused white bloc voting in Town elections."" The Town argued
that white bloc voting patterns could not be "legally significant under the
third Gingles precondition" because the divergent voting patterns were
attributable to partisan affiliation, not race.' 93 The Town argued that the
majority of white voters in the Town of Hempstead had voted Republi-
can "since time immemorial."' 94
The Second Circuit held that causation was "irrelevant in the inquiry
into the three Gingles preconditions," although it was "relevant in the to-
tality of circumstances inquiry."'95 Relying upon Judge Cabranes' opin-
ion in NAACP v. City of Niagara Falls,"' the Second Circuit adopted the
trial court's approach in light of the political partisanship argument un-
der the "totality of circumstances" analysis, rather than part of the third
Gingles precondition of white racial bloc voting, and determined that
there was legally sufficient bloc voting to defeat the town's minority-
preferred candidates.' 97
The Town persisted in its argument on appeal, arguing that "blacks
have lost as Democrats, not as 'blacks. '"1 98 The Second Circuit addressed
the Town's "principal and pervasive argument" that "political partisan-
ship, rather than race, account[ed] for the defeat of black candidates."' 9
The court also addressed the Town's argument that the plaintiffs had
never tried to prove that the inability of African Americans to elect
Democrats was a function of their race, and thus "'the plaintiffs' claim of
racial vote dilution was a mere euphemism for defeat at the polls and was
legally insufficient."' 2°  Rejecting this contention, the Second Circuit
stated:
The foregoing represents a fundamental misunderstanding of
191. See Goosby v. Town Bd., 956 F. Supp. 326, 351 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), affd, 180 F.3d
476 (2d Cir. 1999).
192. See Goosby, 180 F.3d at 492.
193. Id. at 493.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 493 (quoting Lewis v. Alamance County, 99 F.3d 600, 616 n.12 (4th Cir.
1996)).
196. 65 F.3d 1002 (2nd Cir. 1995).
197. See Goosby, 180 F.3d at 493 (citing City of Niagra Falls, 65 F.3d at 1019).
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what the plaintiff class alleged and proved to the satisfaction of
the district court. The claim was that the at-large system of
voting made it impossible for blacks to elect their preferred
candidates. The Town's argument implies that if blacks regis-
tered and voted as Republicans, they would be able to elect the
candidates they prefer. But they are not able to elect preferred
candidates under the Republican Party regime that rules in the
Town. Moreover, blacks should not be constrained to vote for
Republicans who are not their preferred candidates. 21
The Second Circuit distinguished League of United Legal American
Citizens v. Clements (LULAC) as being in sharp contrast to the factual
situation in Goosby, where "[w]ithout access to the Republic slating pro-
cess, blacks [in the Town of Hempstead] simply are unable to have any
preferred candidate elected to the Town Board, given the historical suc-
cess of the Republican Party in all Town Board elections. ' '202 The Second
Circuit differentiated the case from LULAC, because white voters,
Democrat and Republican, supported minority candidates who were
elected by their parties at levels that were equal to or greater than those
of white candidates. It was proper to conclude in LULAC that the di-
vergent voting patterns among white and black voters were "best ex-
plained by partisan affiliation., 203 In Goosby, the district court reasoned
that:
In evaluating all of the relevant facts as a whole, including the
size of the Town, the absence of geographic subdistricts, the
lack of access by blacks to the Republican Party slating process,
the unfortunate use of racial appeals in political campaigns, the
lack of responsiveness by the Town Board to the particularized
needs of the black communities, and the stated desire by the
Town government to cling to a monolithic, single-voice legisla-
ture for a heterogeneous population consisting of many differ-
ent communities and voices, I conclude that black citizens' fail-
ure to elect representatives of their choice to the Town Board is
not best explained by partisan politics.
2 4
The district court was affirmed on appeal and in the remedy phase, the
Second Circuit agreed that, under Bush v. Vera, the Town's favored plan
was "so unusual and bizarre that it clearly cannot fulfill the 'narrowly
201. Id.
202. Id. at 496.
203. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 861 (5th Cir.
1993).
204. Goosby v. Town Bd., 956 F. Supp. 326, 355 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
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tailored' requirement. '"2'5 According to the district court, the segregation
resulting from the Town's two-district plan was "almost total," with
ninety-seven percent of the black voters of the Town being placed in Dis-
trict One, with an overall black population greater than fifty-eight per-
cent, as contrasted to District Two, which contained the rest of the Town,
which was less than three percent black. 06 The district court had "found
that the sole motivating factor for this two-district political division was
race," and the proposed plan violated the Fourteenth Amendment2 O
Although the two-district plan was rejected by the district court on the
basis that race was the sole factor motivating it, the district court found
that "race played a role, but was not the predominant factor, in the six-
district plan."28 That plan accorded with traditional districting princi-
ples, and race consciousness was a subordinate factor in it.20 The Second
Circuit upheld the district court in ordering the six-district plan as a rem-
edy, holding that
even if the six district plan required strict scrutiny, it is in any
event narrowly tailored to the goal of remedying the vote dilu-
tion found here. It includes six reasonably compact districts
that are normal in shape and approximately equal in size of
population. It respects local community boundaries, and racial
considerations were addressed only insofar as necessary to rem-
edy the violation. We think that the six-district plan is an en-
210tirely appropriate remedy under the circumstances.
The Second Circuit's decision accords with the Supreme Court's recent
decisions with respect to race-conscious remedial measures. In non-
voting rights cases, the Supreme Court has suggested that any race-
conscious remedial measure is subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause.21' This is true regardless of which race is burdened or
212benefited by the racial classification at issue. Under strict scrutiny, a
205. Goosby, 180 F.3d at 498 (citing Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 962 (1996)). The
town's favored plan was a two-district plan containing one single-member district "en-
compassing one-sixth of the Town's population and a majority of the Town's black popu-





210. Id. See generally Benjamin E. Griffith, Implementing the Race-Predominant
Standard for State and Local Government Redistricting Plans, 27 STETSON L. REV. 835
(1998).
211. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
212. See id. at 221-22 (citing City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494
(1989)).
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racial classification is required to be justified by a compelling govern-
mental interest and narrowly tailored to further that interest."' To assess
whether a remedy has been narrowly tailored, four factors must be con-
sidered and assessed:
The necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternative reme-
dies; the flexibility and duration of the relief; the relationship of
the numerical goals to the relevant market; and the impact of
the relief on the rights of third parties.214
When a remedial measure is challenged as not being narrowly tailored,
the party defending the remedial measure carries the burden of proving
that the remedial measure is constitutional.215 A race-conscious remedy is
required to be narrowly tailored to eliminate the effects of past discrimi-
nation as well as bar similar discrimination in the future and must be
framed so as to address the exact effects and harms of the discrimination
at issue."' Finally, a race-conscious remedy should be the remedy of last
resort, and "will not be deemed to be narrowly tailored until less sweep-
ing alternatives-particularly race-neutral [or less restrictive remedies]-
have been considered and tried.
2 17
It is for the above reasons that a number of circuits, most notably the
Eleventh, launch into vote dilution inquiries with regard to remedy and
liability as inseparable issues, and it is for this reason that section 2 de-
fendants often level the bulk of their firepower at a clear demonstration
218of the absence of a feasible, constitutional remedy.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this first Election Law Symposium sponsored by the Catholic Uni-
versity Law Review, a few closing remarks are in order. First, America
has long been considered a melting pot, and one that has not boiled over,
thanks to the rule of law. The contrast with the gruesome ethnic cleans-
213. See Goosby, 180 F.3d at 498 (citing Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 962 (1996)).
214. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987).
215. See Aiken v. City of Memphis, 37 F.3d 1155, 1162 (6th Cir. 1994).
216. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227-28.
217. Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 666 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Adarand, 515 U.S.
at 237. See generally Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1199 (11th Cir. 1999)
(holding that unless a plaintiff demonstrates the existence of a proper remedy, and proves
the viability of an alternate election scheme that would provide better access to the politi-
cal process, then the "challenged voting practice is not responsible for the claimed in-
jury"); Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1531 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc) ("A district court
must determine as part of the Gingles threshold inquiry whether it can fashion a permissi-
ble remedy in the particular context of the challenged system.").
218. See Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40 (1993).
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ing that has taken place in Bosnia and most recently in Kosovo is a stark
one. We are a people from diverse ethnic, racial, and religious back-
grounds who have long experienced the social, political, and religious
freedoms that are unique to our relatively young Nation. Many have
thrived upon those freedoms, but some have not. Second, the key to re-
moving barriers to equal electoral opportunity is and has always been ac-
cess and participation, aided by vigorous enforcement of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. Many of those barriers are now relegated to history.
Third, we are witnessing a mid-course correction as we approach the new
millennium. It is not a rollback of civil rights earned in the 1960s and re-
fined in the ensuing two decades, but it is a steady and principled move
toward the center. Indeed, it is a move away from self-defeating entitle-
ment theory that confuses guaranteed results and "safe" electoral dis-
tricts with equal opportunity. It is a visionary move toward the political
reality of one nation, indivisible.
